Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2-2022

The Second Transformation of the International Intellectual
Property Regime
Peter K. Yu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the International
Trade Law Commons

8

Peter K Yu*

1. Introduction
A quarter of a century ago, the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and the marriage of intellectual property
(IP) and trade through the World Trade Organization (WTO) transformed the international
IP regime. This Agreement ushered in not only new international minimum standards for
protecting and enforcing IP rights, but also major changes to domestic IP systems across the
world. As Frederick Abbott, Thomas Cottier, and Francis Gurry recounted in their widely
used textbook, ‘[t]he TRIPS Agreement represented a sea change in the international regulation of [intellectual property rights]’.1 Other commentators concurred. Sam Ricketson described the TRIPS Agreement as ‘a conceptual leap’,2 while Charles McManis observed that
‘the field of international IP law underwent a tectonic shift with the promulgation of the
[TRIPS Agreement]’.3
Today, the international IP regime is being transformed once again. Thanks to the proliferation of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade and investment agreements, new international minimum standards are being developed to protect the investment-related aspects
of IP rights.4 Unlike the WTO, which provides for only state-to-state dispute settlement,
the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism built into these newly adopted
international agreements enables private investors, such as IP right-holders, to sue foreign
governments without the support of their home governments.5 In view of the potential
* This chapter draws on research the author conducted for an earlier article in the Loyola University Chicago
Law Journal.
1 Frederick M Abbott, Thomas Cottier, and Francis Gurry, International Intellectual Property in an Integrated
World Economy (4th edn, Wolters Kluwer Law and Business 2019) 4.
2 Sam Ricketson, ‘The Future of Traditional Intellectual Property Conventions in the Brave New World of
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights’ (1995) 26 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright
Law 872, 883.
3 Charles R McManis, ‘Teaching Current Trends and Future Developments in Intellectual Property’ (2008) 52
St Louis University Law Journal 855, 856.
4 Peter K Yu, ‘The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2017) 66 American University
Law Review 829 (hereafter Yu, ‘Investment-Related Aspects’); Peter K Yu, ‘The Non-Multilateral Approach to
International Intellectual Property Normsetting’ in Daniel J Gervais (ed), International Intellectual Property: A
Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 110–12 (hereafter Yu, ‘Non-Multilateral
Approach’).
5 On the comparison between state-to-state and investor-state dispute settlement, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
‘Protecting Fundamental Values in International IP Disputes: Investor-State vs. WTO Adjudication’ in Christophe
Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Investment Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020);
Peter K Yu, ‘State-to-State and Investor-State Copyright Dispute Settlement’ in Ysolde Gendreau (ed), Le droit
d’auteur en action: Perspectives internationales sur les recours (Les Éditions Thémis 2019); Peter K Yu, ‘The Pathways
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2. Transformations
2.1 Origins
When the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention)
and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention) were established in the late nineteenth century, countries were eager to develop international minimum standards to facilitate trade in IP goods.7 Although these historic Conventions introduced only piecemeal standards in the area of IP enforcement,8 they
combatted piracy and counterfeiting by strengthening IP protections for foreign authors,
inventors, and other right-holders.
Until the launch of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the mid-
1980s, members of the Paris and Berne Unions gathered together every decade or two
to revise international IP norms.9 These repeated revisions sought to address changes

of Multinational Intellectual Property Dispute Settlement’ in Christopher Heath and Anselm Kamperman Sanders
(eds), Intellectual Property and International Dispute Resolution (Kluwer Law International 2019).
6 Ruth L Okediji, ‘Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the International Intellectual
Property System’ (2014) 35 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1121, 1122 (hereafter Okediji,
‘Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?’).
7 Peter K Yu, ‘Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime’ (2004) 38 Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review 323, 339, 352 (hereafter Yu, ‘Currents and Crosscurrents’).
8 Examples of these rare and piecemeal enforcement provisions are Arts 9, 10(1), 10bis, and 10ter of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (opened for signature 14 July 1967, entered into force 26
April 1970, as last revised at Stockholm 14 July 1967, and amended 28 September 1979) 828 UNTS 305 and Arts
13(3), 15, and 16 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (opened for signature 9 September 1886, entered into force 5 December 1887, as last revised at Paris 24 July 1971, and amended 28
September 1979) 1161 UNTS 30.
9 Sam Ricketson, The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property: A Commentary (Oxford
University Press 2015) 65–96 (hereafter Ricketson, Paris Convention); Sam Ricketson and Jane C Ginsburg,
International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond vol 1 (2nd edn, Oxford
University Press 2005) 84–133 (hereafter Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright).
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ramifications of this new mechanism, and the related commitments under new international investment agreements, one cannot help but wonder whether the international IP
regime is now experiencing yet another ‘sea change’ or ‘tectonic shift’. As Ruth L Okediji
reminded us, the intersection of IP and investment is ‘not only a new frontier in investment
arbitration, but more importantly, uncharted territory in the increasingly complex and contested landscape of international intellectual property obligations’.6
Focusing on the potential second transformation of the international IP regime brought
about by the growing intrusion of international investment norms, this chapter addresses the structural changes that these new norms have posed to the regime. It begins
by documenting changes brought about by the first and potential second transformations
of this regime. The chapter then discusses three sets of problems that have emerged when
international investment norms intrude into the IP domain. It concludes by proposing
three solutions to curtail inappropriate and unnecessary intrusions and to improve the engagement of international IP and investment norms. Matching the central theme of this
edited volume, all of these solutions involve constitutional hedges around the IP domain.
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2.2 First Transformation
In the mid-1980s, GATT members began to explore the development of new international
IP norms in the international trade regime. Such development led to the adoption of the

10

Ricketson, Paris Convention (n 9) 83, 86; Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright (n 9) 84–85.
Peter K Yu, ‘A Tale of Two Development Agendas’ (2009) 35 Ohio Northern University Law Review 465, 471–
93, 505–11.
12 On TRIPS negotiations, see generally Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis
(3rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 3–27; Duncan Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS
Agreement (Routledge 2002); Susan K Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property
Rights (Cambridge University Press 2003) 96–120 (hereafter Sell, Private Power, Public Law); Jayashree Watal,
Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer Law International 2001) 11–47 (hereafter Watal, Intellectual Property Rights); Peter K Yu, ‘TRIPs and Its Discontents’ (2006) 10 Marquette Intellectual
Property Law Review 369, 371–79 (hereafter Yu, ‘TRIPs and Its Discontents’).
13 Yu, ‘Currents and Crosscurrents’ (n 7) 355.
14 Joe Karaganis and Sean Flynn, ‘Networked Governance and the USTR’ in Joe Karaganis (ed), Media Piracy
in Emerging Economies (Social Science Research Council 2011); Paul C B Liu, ‘U.S. Industry’s Influence on
Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301 Actions’ (1994) 13 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 87.
11
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precipitated by the advent of new technologies, the growing business demand for greater IP
protection, and drastic changes in the geopolitical environment. Since its inception in 1883,
the Paris Convention has been revised six times—in 1900, 1911, 1925, 1934, 1958, and 1967,
respectively. Likewise, the Berne Convention has undergone revision seven times—in 1896,
1908, 1914, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971, respectively. While the membership in both Unions
remained small before the Second World War,10 the post-war decolonisation movement resulted in the arrival of many newly independent countries from the developing world.
The active admission of these countries into the Paris and Berne Unions eventually led
to demands for major adjustments to the international IP regime. Such demands and related adjustments included the adoption of the Stockholm Protocol Regarding Developing
Countries, the formation of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as a UN
specialised agency, and the proposed revision of the Paris Convention.11 As WIPO membership grew in the 1970s and 1980s, developed countries became increasingly frustrated by their greatly reduced ability to push for new and more stringent international
IP norms. Their frustrations eventually led them to move outside WIPO to push for new
norms through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and later through the
WTO.12 This forum shift, in turn, sparked the first transformation of the international IP
regime.
As stated in the TRIPS preamble, a key expectation of developed countries in their push
for new international IP norms under the GATT/WTO is ‘the provision of effective and
expeditious procedures for the multilateral prevention and settlement of disputes between
governments’. Although both the Paris and Berne Conventions provide an optional dispute settlement mechanism for Member States to take disputes to the International Court
of Justice, no country has ever used that mechanism.13 As a result, disagreements between
the different Union members over the interpretation of international IP norms could only
be addressed through the revision process every decade or two—or, worse, through power-
driven diplomacy, such as the threats of unilateral trade sanctions under the United States
Trade Representative’s notorious Section 301 process.14
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15 R Michael Gadbaw, ‘Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience’
(1989) 22 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 223; Joseph Straus, ‘A Marriage of Convenience: World
Economy and Intellectual Property from 1990 to 2012’ (2012) 40 AIPLA Quarterly Journal 633.
16 Yu, ’Currents and Crosscurrents’ (n 7) 357.
17 Sell, Private Power, Public Law (n 12) 113; Yu, ‘TRIPs and Its Discontents’ (n 12) 379–83.
18 See also the chapter ‘Hedging Bets with BITS: The Impact of Investment Obligations on Intellectual Property
Norms’ by Rochelle C Dreyfuss in this volume.
19 P Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth L Okediji, ‘Contours of an International Instrument on Limitations and
Exceptions’ in Neil Weinstock Netanel (ed), The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and Developing
Countries (Oxford University Press 2008) 491 (hereafter Hugenholtz and Okediji, ‘Contours of an International
Instrument’).
20 Michael Geist, ‘Why We Must Stand on Guard Over Copyright’ Toronto Star (20 October 2003) D3; Peter
K Yu, ‘The International Enclosure Movement’ (2007) 82 Indiana Law Journal 827, 892–94 (hereafter Yu,
‘International Enclosure Movement’).
21 Gregory Shaffer, ‘Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides?
The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection’ in Keith E Maskus and Jerome H Reichman (eds),
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TRIPS Agreement alongside other WTO agreements in Marrakesh in April 1994. This
Agreement provided international minimum standards for eight categories of IP rights—
namely, copyrights, patents, trade marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, plant
variety protections, integrated circuit topographies, and protections for undisclosed information (such as trade secrets and the protections for undisclosed test or other data for
pharmaceutical and agrochemical products). The Agreement also laid down detailed provisions concerning the enforcement of IP rights—a key deficiency in the Paris and Berne
Conventions. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement made the WTO dispute settlement process
mandatory for addressing disputes arising under the agreement.
Marrying IP to trade, the GATT, and later the WTO,15 the TRIPS Agreement has caused
three major structural changes to the international IP regime. First, as far as future international IP negotiations are concerned, the Agreement has transformed the negotiating
forum from a ‘one country, one vote’ platform (which still exists today at WIPO diplomatic conferences) to one that supports greater participation of developed countries.16
Commentators have widely criticised the wide range of horse-trading at the Uruguay
Round, which has put developing countries at a significant disadvantage.17
Second, the TRIPS Agreement has put a heavy trade gloss on international IP norms.
For example, in her chapter in this edited volume, Rochelle C Dreyfuss criticised the WTO
Panel in Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products for failing to ‘directly [consider] the public welfare goals that Canada was seeking to promote’ and the Panel in United
States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act for construing the three-step test in a way
that ‘le[ft] no room for consideration of the public interest’.18 Likewise, P Bernt Hugenholtz
and Ruth L Okediji have lamented that the WTO’s view of ‘IP protection . . . through its impact on free trade . . . [has] provide[d]a distinct gloss on the interpretation of TRIPS obligations that often disregards cultural and other relevant criteria central to both national and
international copyright systems’.19 The concerns among these commentators are understandable, considering the significant differences between evaluating IP policies as part of a
package trade deal and evaluating those same policies independently.20
Third, the TRIPS Agreement has ushered in a new mandatory dispute settlement process
that helps clarify international IP norms. This newly developed process contrasts significantly with the optional dispute settlement processes that have been built into the Paris and
Berne Conventions. While the WTO process is open to all Member States, the high costs
involved in state-to-state dispute settlement have put developing countries at a structural
disadvantage.21 As a result, developed countries were the primary users of this process in
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its first five years of existence.22 In later years, however, large emerging countries, such as
Brazil, China, and India, have begun to use the process more frequently,23 although this
process has remained rarely used among low-income and low-middle-income countries.

Today, the international IP regime is being transformed once again—this time, through a potential marriage of IP and investment. This ongoing transformation is the result of two parallel sets of developments. Since the mid-2000s, developed countries and their like-minded
trading partners have actively negotiated bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements that contain investment chapters. Cases in point are Chapter 10 of the Dominican
Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 11 of the Korea–United States
Free Trade Agreement, and Chapter 9 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement—which
became the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) following the United States’ withdrawal from the regional pact.
In the past few years, multinational IP right-holders have also actively explored the use
of ISDS in the IP context. Leading the pack was tobacco giant Philip Morris, which used the
mechanism in bilateral investment agreements to challenge the tobacco control measures
in Uruguay and Australia.24 Eli Lilly quickly followed suit by utilising the North American
Free Trade Agreement to seek compensation for the Canadian courts’ invalidation of its
patents on the hyperactivity drug Strattera (atomoxetine) and the anti-psychotic drug
Zyprexa (olanzapine).25 A few years later, the Japanese Bridgestone Group mounted yet another ISDS complaint following the Supreme Court of Panama’s decision to fine its subsidiaries for their wrongful opposition of a potentially infringing trade mark.26
Like the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, the arrival of international investment
agreements—or plurilateral trade agreements with investment chapters—is now fostering
three major structural changes to the international IP regime. First, as far as future international IP negotiations are concerned, these international agreements are transforming
the negotiating forum from a multilateral platform to a plurilateral one. Heavily criticised
by commentators for promoting the formation of ‘country clubs’, these agreements enable
developed countries and their like-minded trading partners to develop new international
IP norms.27 Because developing countries, including many emerging countries, have been
International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge
University Press 2005) 895–901.
22 William J Davey, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years’ (2005) 8 Journal of International
Economic Law 17, 17 (hereafter Davey, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement System’); Peter K Yu, ‘TRIPS and Its Achilles’
Heel’ (2011) 18 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 479, 515–16.
23 Davey, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (n 22) 24; Peter K Yu, ‘Are Developing Countries Playing a Better
TRIPS Game?’ (2011) 16 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 311, 333–36.
24 Philip Morris Asia Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia, Notice of Claim (22 June 2011) PCA Case No 2012-
12; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration
(19 February 2010).
25 Eli Lilly and Company v Government of Canada, ICSID Case No UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration (12
September 2013).
26 Bridgestone Licensing Services, Inc and Bridgestone Americas, Inc v Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No ARB/
16/34, Request for Arbitration (7 October 2016).
27 Daniel Gervais, ‘Country Clubs, Empiricism, Blogs and Innovation: The Future of International Intellectual
Property Norm Making in the Wake of ACTA’ in Mira Burri and Thomas Cottier (eds), Trade Governance in the
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When policymakers and trade negotiators focus on the protection of intellectual property investments by their own nationals, they will likely be less interested in evaluating the
economic efficiency of the intellectual property system and the welfare gains that system
produces. Instead, they will push for the development of a system that protects foreign investors often at the expense of the public interest . . . the local innovative environment and
the country’s social-economic conditions.30

Third, ISDS allows IP right-holders to sue foreign governments without the support of their
home governments. In doing so, the mechanism empowers multinational corporations at
the expense of developing countries that are already struggling under the existing international IP regime.31 As US Senator Elizabeth Warren lamented a few years ago, ISDS gives
these corporations ‘the right to challenge laws they don’t like—not in court, but in front
of industry-friendly arbitration panels that sit outside any court system’.32 In the recently
adopted United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, the Trump administration has significantly curtailed the use of ISDS in US–Mexico disputes while eliminating its use in US–
Canada disputes three years after the agreement has taken effect.

3. Problems
Since the establishment of the WTO, commentators have widely discussed the problems
brought about by the TRIPS Agreement and its first transformation of the international IP
regime. Instead of rehashing these problems, this section turns to new problems that are
now emerging from the regime’s potential second transformation. Focusing on the ISDS
Digital Age: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2012); Peter K Yu, ‘The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs’
in Dana Beldiman (ed), Access to Information and Knowledge: 21st Century Challenges in Intellectual Property and
Knowledge Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014); Peter K Yu, ‘Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA’
(2011) 64 SMU Law Review 975, 1074–83.
28

Peter K Yu, ‘TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities’ (2014) 37 Fordham International Law Journal 1129.
Yu, ‘International Enclosure Movement’ (n 20) 892–901.
30 Yu, ‘Non-Multilateral Approach’ (n 4) 112.
31 Maude Barlow, ‘CETA Changes Make Investor-State Provisions Worse’ (Huffington Post, 2 February 2016)
<http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/maude-barlow/ceta-changes_b_9130538.html> accessed 22 October 2019;
Daniel J Ikenson, ‘A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement’ (Cato Institute, 4 March 2014) <http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/compromise-
advance-trade-agenda-purge-negotiations-investor-state> accessed 22 October 2019.
32 Deirdre Fulton, ‘As Countries Line up to Sign Toxic Deal, Warren Leads Call to Reject TPP’ (Common
Dreams, 3 February 2016) <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/02/03/countries-line-sign-toxic-deal-
warren-leads-call-reject-tpp> accessed 22 October 2019.
29
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shut out of the plurilateral negotiation process,28 the legitimacy and effectiveness of the
norms established through this process are highly questionable.
Second, the ISDS mechanism built into international trade and investment agreements
put a heavy investment gloss on international IP norms. In an earlier article, I registered my
concern about a growing ‘incentive-investment divide’ among policymakers and negotiators.29 By overemphasising the investment-related aspects of IP rights, these policymakers
and negotiators ignore the primary justification for IP protection—that is, to provide incentives for creativity and innovation. As I noted:
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mechanism that has now been built into many international trade and investment agreements, this section identifies problems that will arise when ISDS is being used in the IP area.
To enhance analytical effectiveness, this section groups the problems based on three distinct concerns: inconsistency, incoherence, and inequity.

The first concern relates to the high volume of inconsistencies the ISDS mechanism has produced.33 These inconsistencies can be found in ‘(1) cases involving the same facts, related
parties, and similar investment rights, (2) cases involving similar commercial situations
and similar investment rights, and (3) cases involving different parties, different commercial situations, and the same investment rights’.34 Such inconsistencies are generally attributed to three factors.
First, ISDS lacks binding precedents.35 Although stare decisis remains a special feature
of common law and may be irrelevant to other legal traditions or dispute settlement arrangements, disputing parties from around the world increasingly expect similar cases
to be decided consistently and predictably.36 In the WTO, for instance, the dispute settlement Panels and the Appellate Body have used previous cases for explanation and support
even though they are not required to follow precedents. As the Appellate Body reasoned in
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the use of earlier relevant cases can help ‘create legitimate expectations among WTO Members’.37
Second, ISDS lacks an appellate mechanism. As Cynthia M Ho lamented, ‘[a]lthough tribunals often rely on prior decisions and awards, and counsel for parties regularly cite prior
decisions, the lack of hierarchy among tribunals as compared to traditional court systems,
as well as the lack of an appellate system, may result in unpredictability’.38 Likewise, Asif
H Qureshi observed, ‘[m]ost successful judicial systems are accompanied by an appellate

33 Charles N Brower and Stephan W Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International
Investment Law?’ (2009) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 471, 473; Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73
Fordham Law Review 1521, 1558–82 (hereafter Franck, ‘Legitimacy Crisis’); Stefanie Schacherer, ‘TPP, CETA and
TTIP between Innovation and Consolidation—Resolving Investor-State Disputes under Mega-regionals’ (2016)
7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 628, 640 (hereafter Schacherer, ‘TPP, CETA and TTIP between
Innovation and Consolidation’); Stephan W Schill, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal of an “Investment Court
System” for TTIP: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law?’ (ASIL
Insights, 22 April 2016) <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/9/european-commissions-proposal-
investment-court-system-ttip-stepping> accessed 28 October 2019 (hereafter Schill, ‘European Commission’s
Proposal’).
34 Franck, ‘Legitimacy Crisis’ (n 33) 1559.
35 Christoph Schreuer and Matthew Weiniger, ‘A Doctrine of Precedent?’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino,
and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press
2008) 1196.
36 August Reinisch, ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), International
Investment Law: A Handbook (C. H. Beck/Nomos/Hart Publishing 2015) 905–08.
37 Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (4 October 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R
(Report of the Appellate Body) 14.
38 Cynthia M Ho, ‘Sovereignty under Siege: Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions’
(2015) 30 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 213, 234 (hereafter Ho, ‘Sovereignty under Siege’).
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3.2 Incoherence
The second concern pertains to the growing incoherence in the international IP system,
which has been built upon not only the TRIPS Agreement but also WIPO-administered
international IP agreements.43 Such incoherence can be attributed to at least four reasons.
First, the proliferation of ISDS cases and the intrusion of international investment norms
into the IP domain have greatly fragmented the multilateral system.44 Indeed, the growing
trend of using investment law and fora to set international IP norms has led norm-setting
activities to shift from the IP regime to the investment regime.45 Such a regime shift has
greatly reduced the historical context concerning international IP laws and policies while at
the same time taking away the technical expertise needed to deal with specific rules in this
fast-evolving area.46 Moreover, the possibility of using parallel proceedings47 to challenge IP
39 Asif H Qureshi, ‘An Appellate System in International Investment Arbitration?’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico
Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University
Press 2008) 1155.
40 Kate Miles, ‘Reconceptualising International Investment Law: Bringing the Public Interest into Private
Business’ in Meredith Kolsky Lewis and Susy Frankel (eds), International Economic Law and National Autonomy
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 295–96.
41 Ho, ‘Sovereignty under Siege’ (n 38) 234; Schacherer, ‘TPP, CETA and TTIP between Innovation and
Consolidation’ (n 33) 647.
42 Yu, ‘Investment-Related Aspects’ (n 4) 853–54.
43 Peter K Yu, ‘International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia’ [2007]
Michigan State Law Review 1, 18 (hereafter Yu, ‘International Enclosure’).
44 Eyal Benvenisti and George W Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the
Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 595, 597–98; Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘U.S. Trade
Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas’ in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift
to Preferential Trade Agreements (AEI Press 1995) 2–3; Xavier Seuba, ‘Jurisdictional Overlaps in International
Intellectual Property: Challenges Arising from the Proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements Regulating
Intellectual Property Rights’ in Christophe Geiger (ed), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Investment
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020); Yu, ‘Non-Multilateral Approach’ (n 4) 93–94.
45 Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy Frankel, ‘From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law Is
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property’ (2015) 36 Michigan Journal of International Law 557, 566 (hereafter
Dreyfuss and Frankel, ‘From Incentive to Commodity to Asset’); James Gathii and Cynthia Ho, ‘Regime Shifting
of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement from the WTO to the International Investment Regime’ (2017) 18 Minnesota
Journal of Law, Science and Technology 427, 430.
46 Hugenholtz and Okediji, ‘Contours of an International Instrument’ (n 19) 491; Watal, Intellectual Property
Rights (n 12) 5; Yu, ‘Currents and Crosscurrents’ (n 7) 367–75.
47 Daniel Kalderimis, ‘Exploring the Differences between WTO and Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution’ in
Susy Frankel and Meredith Kolsky Lewis (eds), Trade Agreements at the Crossroads (Routledge 2014) 58; Katia
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process’.39 Because ISDS lacks such a process, its effectiveness as a quasi-judicial system has
been questioned.
Third, the existing ISDS mechanism does not provide much transparency. As Kate Miles
lamented, although ISDS cases ‘resolve questions that can affect significant matters of
public policy, the public generally does not have access to the documents, the proceedings
are conducted behind closed doors, and the submission of amicus curiae briefs is restricted,
if permitted at all’.40 Even worse, policymakers, commentators, and civil society organisations have thus far had great difficulty uncovering what happens in ISDS proceedings.41
A case in point is Philip Morris’ ISDS case against Australia, where the notice of claim was
made available only through a request for declassification under the Australian Freedom of
Information Act.42 Had the case not been publicly disclosed, one has to wonder whether it
would have received as much public attention.
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[T]he broad definition of covered investment may allow intellectual property rights
holders to use ISDS to demand higher standards of intellectual property protection and
enforcement even when those standards are not required [by the TRIPS Agreement]. If
ISDS-based strategies prove successful, developed country governments and multinational
corporations may become more eager to rewrite international intellectual property rules
outside the usual multilateral fora, such as the WTO and WIPO.54

Even worse, ISDS could take away the many limitations, flexibilities, and safeguards that
have been carefully built into the TRIPS Agreement and the larger international IP system.55
The proliferation of ISDS cases could also create what commentators, intergovernmental
Yannaca-Small, ‘Parallel Proceedings’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008); Yu, ‘Investment-Related
Aspects’ (n 4) 833.
48

Yu, ‘Non-Multilateral Approach’ (n 4) 92.
Peter K Yu, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era’ (2012) 64 Florida Law
Review 1045, 1089.
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violation complaints in the TRIPS context, see Susy Frankel, ‘Challenging TRIPS-
Plus
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Law 1023.
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and IP-related regulations in host states threatens to ‘make the multilateral system less appealing and thereby undermine its stability and growth’.48 For many host states with limited
resources, such as those in the developing world, the greater focus on defending ISDS cases
could also ‘[force these] countries to divert scarce time, resources, energy, and attention
from other international intergovernmental initiatives’, including the development of the
multilateral IP system.49
Second, ISDS awards could undermine the hard-earned bargains developing countries
have won through the WTO negotiations.50 In fact, those awards could slowly rewrite the
TRIPS Agreement—or, for that matter, other multilateral trade or IP agreements.51 A case
in point is the moratorium imposed on non-violation complaints—complaints of nullification or impairment of trade benefits when no substantive violation has occurred.52 Since
the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, this moratorium has been repeatedly extended, most
recently during the Eleventh WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina in
December 2017. Despite this extension, nothing prevents ISDS arbitrators from considering complaints that are based on impaired benefits or frustrated expectations, as opposed
to substantive violations.
Third, ISDS could ratchet up the standards of IP protection and enforcement, thereby
amplifying the widely documented deleterious impacts of TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional,
and plurilateral agreements.53 As I noted in an earlier article:
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Because investor rights and IP [intellectual property] rights are both private rights, IP
holders tend to equate the investment protectable under these instruments to the private
economic value of their IP rights. Further, they see IP rights as reliance interests that are
defined by the law at the time they made their investment or, more extremely, when the
agreement references TRIPS or its own IP chapter, the law at the time when the investment
agreement was made.60

In addition, there is growing concern that ISDS arbitrators will focus narrowly on the IP
side of the investment bargain, thus ignoring the concessions the host state has made outside the IP field, such as free lands, tax breaks, exemption from export custom duties, and
preferential treatment on foreign exchange.61

Kathleen Liddell and Michael Waibel, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment and Judicial Patent Decisions’ (2016) 19
Journal of International Economic Law 145, 146 (hereafter Liddell and Waibel, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’);
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Hedging: Overlapping and Accumulating Protection for IP Assets on a Global Scale’ by Henning Grosse Ruse-
Khan in this volume.
56 Ho, ‘Sovereignty under Siege’ (n 38) 233; Lone Wandahl Mouyal, International Investment Law and the Right
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International
Investment Governance (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2015) 128.
57 Brook K Baker and Katrina Geddes, ‘The Incredible Shrinking Victory: Eli Lilly v. Canada, Success, Judicial
Reversal, and Continuing Threats from Pharmaceutical ISDS’ (2017) 49 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
479, 505; Mouyal, International Investment Law (n 56) 68; ‘TPP’s ISDS: Moving from State-to-State to Company-
to-World Dispute Resolution’ (Legal Reader, 1 May 2015) <http://www.legalreader.com/tpps-isds-moving-from-
state-to-state-to-company-to-world-dispute-resolution> accessed 22 October 2019.
58 Liddell and Waibel, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ (n 55) 147; Yu, ‘Investment-Related Aspects’ (n 4) 876.
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Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 33; Anastasia Telesetsky, ‘A New
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bodies, and civil society organisations have widely referred to as ‘regulatory chill’—a
chilling effect that undermines a country’s sovereign ability to regulate harmful conduct, including conduct committed by transnational corporations.56 Finding it costly to go through
the ISDS process, host states with limited resources, such as those in the developing world,
may be too eager to change their laws to avoid costly arbitrations.57
Finally, ISDS arbitrators are generally unfamiliar with IP issues and may therefore subscribe to an oversimplified view of IP.58 For example, they may focus primarily on the protection levels without adequately considering the corresponding limitations, flexibilities,
and safeguards. They may also have tunnel vision and thereby overemphasise IP rights as
investors’ rights.59 As Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy Frankel described:
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3.3 Inequity

ICSID arbitrators . . . get referred to as ‘elite lawyers,’ ‘ambitious investment lawyers keen to
make a lucrative living,’ a ‘mafia,’ ‘super arbitrators’ who are ‘not just the mafia but a smaller,
inner mafia,’ adjudicators—not faceless—but with conflicts of interest and a ‘hidden
agenda’ (‘one minute acting as counsel, the next framing the issue as an academic, or influencing policy as a government representative or expert witness’).65

Moreover, when ISDS is used against host states in the developing world, policymakers,
commentators, and civil society organisations have noted their concern for the mechanism’s
‘development bias’.66 Such bias enables the process to favour the interests of transnational
corporations at the expense of host states in the developing world.67 As former Bolivian
president Evo Morales declared, ‘Governments in Latin America and I think all over the
world never win the cases. The transnationals always win.’68 This type of sentiment is unsurprising considering that investors from developed countries filed the majority of ISDS
complaints.69
In sum, the intrusion of international investment norms into the IP domain has brought
many substantive and procedural problems that are inherent in ISDS. This mechanism has
made the evolving international IP norms less consistent, less coherent, and less equitable.
Considering that ISDS is here to stay—a view held not only by me but also by many other
commentators—it will be important to start thinking about the reform measures needed to
address the three concerns identified in this section.
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International Law 761, 783 (hereafter Pauwelyn, ‘The Rule of Law’).
63 David Gaukrodger and Kathryn Gordon, ‘Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the
Investment Policy Community’ (2012) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Working
Paper on International Investment No 2012/03, 44; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Transformative Transatlantic Free
Trade Agreements without Rights and Remedies of Citizens?’ (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law
579, 604.
64 Pauwelyn, ‘The Rule of Law’ (n 62) 764.
65 ibid 780. See the chapters: ‘Hedging Bets with BITS: The Impact of Investment Obligations on Intellectual
Property Norms’ by Rochelle C Dreyfuss and ‘Effects of Combined Hedging: Overlapping and Accumulating
Protection for IP Assets on a Global Scale’ by Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan in this volume.
66 Susan D Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2009) 50 Harvard
International Law Journal 435, 451.
67 ibid 450–51.
68 Leslie Mazoch, ‘Chavez Takes Cool View toward OAS, Says Latin America Better Off without World Bank’
(Associated Press International, 30 April 2007).
69 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘World Investment Report 2016: Investor
Nationality: Policy Challenges’ (June 2016) UNCTAD/WIR/2016, 105.
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The last concern regards inequity, especially the inequity suffered by host states in the developing world. Thus far, the existing ISDS mechanism has been heavily criticised for having
partial and unaccountable arbitrators.62 For instance, the arbitrators involved may have
worked in law firms that have clients in the same industry as those filing ISDS complaints.63
They may also have a tendency to serve corporate clients who are similar to the complainants.64 As Joost Pauwelyn summarised:

The Second Transformation of the International IP Regime

187

4. Solutions

4.1 Behind Hedges
The first recommendation concerns efforts to erect constitutional hedges around the IP
domain. As this chapter has noted earlier, many of the concerns sparked by the first and
potential second transformations of the international IP regime pertain to the structural
changes brought about by the arrival of new international norms that do not share the same
objectives, logic, and rationales behind the protection of IP rights. Their different orientation has caused these emergent norms—be they trade-related or investment-related—to
augment the protection of IP rights beyond what would be suitable under local conditions.
These norms have often elevated the level of protection in the IP system to the point that
the system can no longer provide the traditional, and much-needed, safeguards to promote
competition, consumer welfare, and follow-on creativity and innovation.
To ensure the proper functioning of the IP system, this section calls for the decoupling
of international IP norms from norms in the trade or investment area. In an article written
more than a decade ago, I underscored the importance of delinking IP from trade when
evaluating IP policies. With the growing intrusion of international investment norms into
the IP domain, it is time we extended this earlier proposal to the investment context. The
goal of such an extension is not to force international IP norms to be ‘read in clinical isolation’ from other international norms—a concern the WTO Appellate Body rightly noted in
United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline.70 Rather, the proposed approach aims to ensure that the analysis of IP policies takes proper consideration of
the objectives, logic, and rationales behind the protection of IP rights.
The easiest way to delink IP from investment is by requiring ISDS arbitrators to refrain
from making an automatic assumption that IP rights are covered investments within the
meaning of international investment agreements. The removal of this misguided assumption is important because most international investment agreements or plurilateral trade
agreements with investment chapters have a broad definition of covered investment. A case
in point is the TPP Agreement, which has now been incorporated into the CPTPP. Art 9.1
of the former defines ‘investment’ as ‘every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly
or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics
as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the
assumption of risk’. The provision further states that ‘forms that an investment may take

70 United States—
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R
(Report of the Appellate Body) 17 (hereafter US—Gasoline).
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Taking advantage of the focus of this edited volume on new constitutionalism, this section
proposes three solutions that involve constitutional hedges around the IP domain. Inspired
by the long-standing use of institutional separation and coordination in constitutional
designs—such as the separation-of-powers doctrine—these solutions show how greater
separation, coordination, and cross-fertilisation of international IP and investment norms
can protect the integrity of the international IP regime.
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Intellectual property rights can be held simultaneously in many countries and in some
cases, like copyright, without any formalities or other domestic process that would indicate a specific investment purpose. Is merely having authorial works in circulation in a host
country sufficient to constitute an ‘investment in a given country?’ Similarly, where patent
rights are acquired by mere registration, such as in many least-developed countries, should
this alone confer the status of an ‘investment’? Should requirements of local working conditions that more firmly anchor the patent grant to domestic priorities make a difference in
an assessment of a protected investment?71

In fact, if IP rights acquired in the host state can automatically become investments regardless of whether investments have been made in that state, many of the safeguards and adjustments provided by the TRIPS Agreement will immediately be lost.72
One test that has garnered considerable support from commentators was used in Salini
Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Kingdom of Morocco, a case involving the construction
of a Moroccan highway by Italian contractors.73 This test took into consideration four distinct factors: ‘[1]contributions, [2] a certain duration of performance of the contract . . . [3]
a participation in the risks of the transaction . . . [and] [4] the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the investment’.74 Applied to the IP context, Lukas
Vanhonnaeker translated these factors as follows:
(i) IP is susceptible to be invested for a certain duration; (ii) it is likely to generate profit
and return on a regular basis; (iii) IP, and more precisely, [IP rights] ‘share the unique and
constant risk of infringement by third parties not privileged in their use’; (iv) IP investment
often represents a substantial commitment; and (v) such assets have a significant potential
to contribute to the Host State’s development.75

Through a close examination of these factors, the Salini test forces ISDS arbitrators to ask
whether actual investments have been made in the host state.
71
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include . . . intellectual property rights’, which are defined in the TPP IP chapter as ‘all categories . . . that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement’.
Given the exceedingly broad coverage of ‘investment’ in the CPTPP and other international trade and investment agreements, IP right-holders can now use the ISDS mechanism to protect many different rights even when no actual investment has been made in
the host state. As Ruth L Okediji reminded us:
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4.2 Across Hedges
The second recommendation relates to the need to develop rules to govern the interfaces
between the different regimes78 within the larger ‘international intellectual property regime
complex’.79 When property owners erect hedges around their property, they do not always
forbid neighbours from entering their land. Nevertheless, standards do exist as to when and
how property lines can be crossed. Sometimes, these standards are dictated by law, such as
in the form of property rights, trespass actions, and criminal statutes. At other times, the
standards are merely derived from prevailing customs or social norms—for example, it is
acceptable to cross property lines based on the fact that your neighbour has invited you to
do so in the past.
Because the engagement of international IP and investment norms is relatively new and
the boundaries between the two remain unclear, it will be useful to develop ‘rules of engagement’ to ensure better interactions between these two sets of norms. In the international
arena, the starting point for locating such rules is the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention).80 Art 31(1) stipulates that ‘[a]treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. For the purposes of treaty interpretation, acceptable contexts include those provided by a related agreement, a subsequent
agreement, or subsequent practice involving the relevant parties.
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Apart from making this inquiry, ISDS arbitrators should pay greater attention to the contingent nature of IP rights.76 Just because these rights have been initially granted does not
mean that they will enjoy full protection for the entire duration of an international investment agreement. Unlike rights to tangible property, IP rights are subject to many contingencies, including limited duration, dependence on the payment of renewal or maintenance
fees, the possibility of subsequent invalidation or revocation, and the existence of both internal and external limits.77 The more deeply the arbitrators understand the contingent nature of IP rights, the less likely it is for them to use the initially granted rights as proxies for
the covered investments.
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Given the benefits provided by the Vienna Convention, it is no surprise that WTO
Panels have widely applied the Convention in their decisions.81 Since United States—
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the first case resolved through the
mandatory dispute settlement process, WTO Panels have embraced Art 31 of the Vienna
Convention as a general rule of interpretation. Endorsing the Panel’s position in that case,
the Appellate Body described Art 31 as ‘a fundamental rule of treaty interpretation’.82 In the
TRIPS context, this rule of interpretation was first applied in India—Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, which addressed India’s failure to provide a mailbox system as required by Art 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement.83 The application
of the Convention continues in later cases. In China—Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, for instance, the WTO Panel declined to treat
the United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement as a subsequent agreement within the
meaning of the Vienna Convention.84
In the investment context, Susy Frankel suggested that this Convention ‘can be used to
bring [the] purposes [of international intellectual property and investment agreements]
into compatibility in a way that does not undermine the incentive rationales and calibration
mechanisms that are an important feature of international IP law and where appropriate
recognizes that investment can include IP-related investment, where it truly is investment’.85
In an earlier article, I also advocated using the principles of the Vienna Convention to help
develop a code of conduct for ISDS arbitrators that would require them to consider a host
state’s broad multilateral commitments.86 The arbitrators’ use of this Convention is particularly important considering their continued reluctance to formally apply the Convention—
due perhaps to the fact that an investor-state arbitration involves not only a state but also a
private investor.87
While the Vienna Convention has supplied an ideal set of rules to guide the engagement
of international IP and investment norms, other rules and principles can be utilised to improve the interactions between these two sets of norms. For example, the principle of primacy helps foster a hierarchy that ensures respect for a specific set of norms.88 In the human
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In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.

The precautionary approach ‘imposes regulations on polluters or on those introducing new
technologies to force them to accept responsibility for managing unknown risks associated
with their activities’.90 In recent years, some commentators have extended this approach
to the public health context. For instance, Phoebe Li called for its use to enhance access to
medicines during public health exigencies.91 Given the growing use of the precautionary
approach in new contexts, policymakers and commentators may want to consider applying
it to guide the engagement of international IP norms and norms in the trade or investment
area. The use of this approach will help curtail the inappropriate and unnecessary intrusions
into the IP domain, especially when such intrusions threaten to cause ‘serious or irreversible damage’.

4.3 Beyond Hedges
The final recommendation pertains to the need to facilitate greater cross-fertilisation of
international IP and investment norms as well as those involved in developing or shaping
these norms, such as policymakers and commentators. In an earlier article addressing the
deficiencies of the ISDS mechanism found in bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade and
investment agreements, I advanced a two-tier proposal for developing a dispute settlement
mechanism that would bring together experts in both the IP and trade areas.92
The first part of this proposal calls for a modified version of the existing ISDS mechanism, in which the arbitral panel handling a dispute involving WTO obligations would
have to include at least one arbitrator who has demonstrated knowledge and experience in
issues concerning the specific obligations involved.93 For example, in a dispute involving
89 UNHCR, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution
2000/7’ (17 August 2000) E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7, para 3.
90 Phoebe Li, Health Technologies and International Intellectual Property: A Precautionary Approach (Routledge
2014) 53.
91 ibid 8–9.
92 Peter K Yu, ‘Crossfertilizing ISDS with TRIPS’ (2017) 49 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 321, 341–47
(hereafter Yu, ‘Crossfertilizing ISDS’).
93 ibid 342–44.
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rights area, Resolution 2000/7 of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights reminded governments ‘of the primacy of human rights
obligations over economic policies and agreements’.89 This principle of human rights primacy helps address the continued tensions and conflicts between the protection of human
rights and the non-human rights aspects of IP rights.
In the context of environmental protection, such as in the area of climate change mitigation, commentators and international organisations have widely advocated the use of
the precautionary approach. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development provides:
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IP, the panel would have to include at least one arbitrator who has specialised expertise regarding TRIPS obligations. By contrast, in a dispute involving only traditional investment
issues, no arbitrator with WTO expertise would be required because the dispute will not
implicate any specific WTO obligations.
To determine whether this WTO expertise requirement has been met, the first part of the
proposal calls for the development of a list of arbitrators who are familiar with each WTO
area, similar to the indicative list of governmental and non-governmental individuals specified in Art 8.4 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding or the Roster for NAFTA
Dispute Settlement Panels and Committees. Having a list of qualified arbitrators in a specific WTO area would ensure that the arbitral panels possess the right expertise to make
high-quality decisions. Such a list would also accelerate the panel selection process, thereby
reducing the overall arbitral costs involved.
The second part of the proposal calls for the establishment of a new appellate body, which
was modelled after both the WTO Appellate Body and drew on the European Commission’s
proposal during the now-suspended negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP).94 The EU proposal called for the creation of a two-tier investment
court system that would include a Tribunal of First Instance and an Appeal Tribunal. The
latter would consist of six judges—two each from the European Union, the United States,
and third countries. While the EU proposal was straightforward due to the quasi-bilateral
nature of the TTIP negotiations, a proposal that is designed to resolve ISDS disputes
throughout the world will require a much more complicated selection process.95 Although
one could widely debate which process would result in the best mix of experts in the proposed ISDS appellate body, an easy choice would be to select two members from developed
countries and two from developing countries, as opposed to two each from the European
Union and the United States.
With respect to the two other members who are supposed to come from third states, this
part of the proposal calls for selections from the WTO system—for instance, former WTO
panellists, former members of the WTO Appellate Body, or even experts who are qualified to serve on WTO Panels.96 Through such selections, the proposed ISDS appellate body
would be equipped with arbitrators who are familiar with the WTO and its obligations. The
WTO expertise requirement for this body would be similar to the arrangement for arbitral
panels discussed earlier, except that the appellate body would only require general familiarity with the WTO and its obligations, as opposed to knowledge and experience regarding
the specific WTO obligations involved in the dispute.
If one takes the same view as I do—that the arrival of powerful middle-income countries,
such as Brazil, China, and India, has greatly distorted the international economic system
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to the point that the separation of developed and developing countries no longer provides
satisfactory global representation97—the proposed ISDS appellate body could easily be expanded to eight seats. Those eight seats would include two members each from three groups
of countries: high-income, middle-income, and low-income. The remaining two seats
would be reserved for those with WTO expertise, as discussed earlier.
To be sure, having WTO expertise is not the same as having TRIPS expertise. Indeed, the
WTO has about thirty agreements, whose coverage ranges from goods to services and from
agriculture to textiles. Nevertheless, it is impossible to include experts in all the subject matters covered by the WTO in the proposed ISDS appellate body. Nor is it easy to find many
individual experts with a broad range of WTO expertise who can serve as appellate body
members.
The goal of this part of the proposal is to ensure that somebody in the proposed appellate
body will have demonstrated knowledge and experience in WTO issues so as to promote
coherence between ISDS and the WTO system. The proposal does recognise the inability
to equip the proposed ISDS appellate body with expertise in every single area covered by
the WTO. It also takes note of the fact that the arbitral panel below would already include
at least one arbitrator with demonstrated knowledge and expertise concerning the specific
WTO obligations, such as TRIPS obligations in an IP case. That panel would therefore have
the capability to develop a strong record of the various WTO-related issues, concerns, and
challenges involved, even if it ends up with a decision somewhat inconsistent with the prevailing interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement. Drawing on this record, the proposed ISDS
appellate body should be able to make an informed decision. Members who are already
familiar with the WTO and its obligations should be able to draw on their own experience
and use analogical reasoning to examine the TRIPS-related issues identified by the arbitral panel as if those issues concerned their own field of expertise. They would also be in a
good position to share their WTO experience with fellow members who do not have similar
expertise.
Finally, beyond the two members who have been selected for their WTO expertise, additional WTO expertise might be found in those members of the proposed ISDS appellate
body who have been selected by developed and developing countries—or, in the modified
proposal, by high-income, middle-income, and low-income countries. If such additional
expertise is present, the overall WTO expertise in the proposed appellate body would
greatly increase. Thus, this part of the proposal strongly encourages the selection of members with a diverse and complementary range of WTO expertise. In doing so, the proposed
ISDS appellate body would be well-equipped to handle ISDS cases covering many different
WTO areas.
In sum, the cross-institutional set-up in this two-part proposal would greatly enhance
the quality of the ISDS mechanism. It would also promote coherence and cross-fertilisation
between that mechanism and the WTO dispute settlement process, thereby ensuring
the healthy development of the international IP regime.98 Such cross-fertilisation would
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further alleviate the problems posed by the increasing use of parallel proceedings to challenge IP and IP-related regulations in developing countries, such as those via WTO dispute
settlement and ISDS.

The ongoing intrusion of international investment norms into the IP domain has ushered in
major structural changes to the international IP regime, sparking a potential second transformation. This transformation will affect the existing international minimum standards
for protecting and enforcing IP rights and the attendant limitations and exceptions. It will
also create inconsistency, incoherence, and inequity within the international IP regime.
In view of the challenges posed by the arrival of these new norms and their further intrusion into the IP domain, this chapter proposes three solutions to curtail inappropriate and
unnecessary intrusions and to improve the engagement of international IP and investment
norms. Although the chapter recognises the inevitability that the international IP regime
will continue to evolve and be transformed, it suggests ways to protect the regime’s integrity
by utilising those constitutional hedges that have been, or could be, erected around the IP
domain.
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5. Conclusion

